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. . .wanting to have a biological child is neither a male nor female desire, but a human
desire.1
The latest innovation in the arena of assisted reproductive technologies is uterine trans-
plantation (UTx), described as ‘a new type of quality of life enhancing, as well as a life-
giving transplantation’.2 The world’s first live birth of a child after uterus transplant oc-
curred using a female living donor and recipient in Sweden in 2013.3 The primary pur-
pose of UTx is to restore fertility in female patients with uterus factor infertility (UFI),
which it is claimed affects approximately 1.5 million women worldwide.4
In his insightful paper, ‘Other women’s wombs: uterus transplants and gestational
surrogacy’,5 Robertson notes the ‘important ethical and legal concerns’6 this advance
raises and examines some of the ‘medical, ethical, legal, and policy issues that arise’.7
The focus of the paper is onUTx inwomen to restore fertility. ComparingUTx and ges-
tational surrogacy, Robertson argues ‘if UTx becomes safe and effective, the case for of-
fering UTx to all womenwith UFI is strong’.8 One key question that remains unclear is
whether procreative liberty encompasses a right to ‘gestate’, and controversially, if there
is such a right, whether it is restricted to women suffering fromUFI. Whilst Robertson
1 T. Beatie, Labor of Love: Is Society Ready for this Pregnant Husband?, THE ADVOCATE, Apr. 8, 2008 (accessed
Aug. 12, 2016).
2 M. Brannstrom,Human Uterus Transplantation in Focus, 117 (1) BRIT. MED. BULL. 69–78 (2016).
3 M. Brannstrom et al., Livebirth After Uterus Transplantation, THE LANCET 385 (9968) 607–16 (2015).
4 M. Brannstrom,Human Uterus Transplantation in Focus, 117 (1) BRIT. MED. BULL. 69–78 (2016).
5 John Robertson, Other Women’s Wombs: Uterus Transplants and Gestational Surrogacy, J. L. BIOSCI. 68–86
(2016).
6 Robertson, supra note 5, at 68.
7 Robertson, supra note 5, at 69.
8 Robertson, supra note 5, at 85.
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describes UTx as a ‘technology as less dramatic in scope, but important for affected
women’9 than other ART innovations. Two controversial questions surroundingUTx,
not dealt with in his paper are whether, firstly, it can be argued there is a ‘right’ to ges-
tate under the umbrella of procreative liberty that grounds a claim to positive assistance
and public funding for the costly procedure; and secondly, the possibilities UTx raises
in the future, to widen the reproductive options of transgendered individuals and men
who may seek access to UTx and thus the prospect it raises for unisex gestation.
A RIGHT TO GESTATE?
Robertson’s paper ‘assumes that procreation and child rearing is a fundamental human
right, and uterine infertility should not bar individuals from having genetic offspring
when safe and effective techniques exist for alleviating their condition.’10 He concludes
‘that there is a sound ethical basis to allow surrogacy or transplant to be used bywomen
withuterine factor infertility’.11Thepaperdoesnot discuss directlywhether procreative
liberty encompasses specifically a right to gestate.
In a wealth of literature discussed in the context of assisted reproductive technolo-
gies to overcome infertility, it has been persuasively contended that people have a
‘prima facie’ right to procreative or reproductive autonomy.12 Dworkin has defined the
‘right of procreative autonomy’ as ‘a right of people to control their own role in repro-
ductionunless the statehas a compelling reason fordenying themthat control.’13 Harris
argues that in all democracies, the ‘democratic presumption’ is that individual choices
will not be interfered with unless good and sufficient grounds can be produced for so
doing.14 On the basis of this democratic presumption, the burden falls on thosewishing
to rebut such a presumption to prove that allowing the exercise of such a right would
cause demonstrable harm.
In ‘Children of Choice’,15 Robertson who has substantially contributed to the lit-
erature on procreative liberty, sets out a theoretical framework that consists of three
limbs. Firstly, it involves a ‘right’ to have genetically related children and a converse
right not to. Robertson states: ‘The moral right to reproduce is respected because of
the centrality of reproduction to personal identity, meaning and dignity.’16 Secondly,
9 Robertson, supra note 5, at 69.
10 Robertson, supra note 5, at 69.
11 Robertson, supra note 5, at 69.
12 R. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW (Oxford University Press, 1996); J. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREE-
DOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (New Jersey University Press, 1994); J. Harris, Rights and
Reproductive Choice, in THE FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION 5–37 at pp. 34–35 (John Harris, Soren Holm
ed., Clarendon Press, 1998); J. Harris, Sex Selection and Regulated Hatred, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 291–94 (2005);
B. Steinbock, Regulating Assisted Reproductive Technologies: An Ethical Framework, 6 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES
167–74 (1996); J. ROBERTSON, CHILDRENOFCHOICE: FREEDOMANDTHENEWREPRODUCTIVETECHNOLOGIES
(New Jersey University Press, 1994).
13 R. DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 48 (Harper Collins, 1993); R. LEE & S. MORGAN, HUMAN FERTILIZATION &
EMBRYOLOGY, REGULATING THE REPRODUCTIVE REVOLUTION 29 (Blackstone Press, 2001).
14 J. Harris, No Sex Selection Please, We’re British!, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 286 (2004); J. Harris, Sex Selection and
Regulated Hatred, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 291 (2003).
15 J. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (New Jersey
University Press, 1994).
16 Roberson, supra note 15, at 30.
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although the right has ‘presumptive primacy’,17 Robertson suggests that it is not ab-
solute and should be limited if the exercise of procreative liberty creates ‘harm’.18 He
contends that it is those who seek to limit reproductive choice that should ‘have the
burden of showing that the reproductive actions at issue would create such substan-
tial harm that they could justifiably be limited.’19 Thirdly, Robertson argues that the
right to procreative liberty is a negative one; the State cannot interfere in individuals’
personal reproductive choices, but crucially, it does not have any positive obligations to
assist peoplewith their reproductive decisions, rather that is amatter of a broader social
policy and resource allocation.20
Yet others have asserted it should be a positive right, since for individuals suffering
from problems conceiving or gestating, the only way such individuals can exercise their
procreative liberty is with the positive assistance of third parties and the state.21 In the
context of UTx some commentators have tackled the thorny question of whether in
countries with a publicly funded system, such as the United Kingdom a case can be
made for the public funding of UTx.22 Whilst Robertson notes UTx is a costly proce-
dure, and the difficulties of posing surrogacy as an alternative23 for women for whom
surrogacymay go against the religious, cultural or personal reasons, the issueofwhether
UTx could be regarded as a positive right entitling women with UFI to positive assis-
tance to this costly procedure is not dealt with in his paper but is now a debate that has
to be revisited. This will be particularly true in countries such as the United Kingdom
that do offer public funding for IVF, where it could be argued, just as IVF assists cou-
ples having difficulty in ‘conceiving’, UTx once safe, will assist women having difficulty
‘gestating’.
UTx IN TRANSGENDERED INDIVIDUALS AND MEN
UTx inTransgendered individuals
Whilst all UTx research trials to date have involved women, where it is designed to re-
store natural function, UTx raises the more complex questions of whether others be-
sides womenmay claim a ‘right to gestate’, where it could be used to advance/enhance
natural function. Following on from the news that a healthy child had been born fol-
lowing an UTx, headlines followed that this raised the prospect women may seek ac-
cess to UTx, so that they too can experience pregnancy and the gestation of their own
17 J. A. Robertson, Liberalism and the Limits of Procreative Liberty: A Response to My Critics, 52 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 233 (1995).
18 Note that theoretical interpretations of ‘harm’ have varied.
19 Roberson, supra note 15, at 25.
20 Robertson, supra note 15, at 264.
21 R. Sparrow, Is it ‘Every Man’s Right to Have Babies if He Wants Them?’Male Pregnancy and the Limits of Repro-
ductive Liberty, 18 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 275–99 (2008).
22 S. Wilkinson & NJ Williams, Should Uterus Transplants be Publicly Funded, 42 (9) J. MED. ETHICS 559–
65(2016). Also see the three responses to the article: A Alghrani, Yes, Uterus Transplants Should Be Publicly
Funded!, 42 (9) J. MED. ETHICS 566– 67 (2016); J. Balayla, Public Funding of Uterine Transplantation, 42 (9)
J. MED. ETHICS 568–69 (2016) and M. Lotz, Commentary on Nicola Williams and Stephen Wilkinson: ‘Should
Uterus Transplants Be Publicly Funded?, 42 (9) J. MED. ETHICS 570–71 (2016).
23 Robertson, supra note 5, at 70.
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children.24 Transgenderism is an extreme form of gender dysphoria25 and psycholog-
ically, transgendered individuals regard themselves as being of the opposite gender to
that which they belong to on purely physiological criteria.26 Brothers and Ford elabo-
rate on the condition further:
Gender dysphoria and gender identity disorder are terms used to describe a persistent
desire to be of the opposite sex combinedwith persistent discomfort about one’s assigned
sex or gender role.The diagnosis requires the absence of physical intersex conditions and
the presence of clinically significant distress or impairment of psychological function.27
For trans women, surgical treatment combined with hormonal therapy has now ad-
vanced significantly so that such individuals can attain the appearanceof awoman.Post-
surgery, inmany instances, unless disclosed by the individual, very fewwould know that
the individual had undergone such treatment.While surgery has been successful in this
context and relieved the pressures of individuals suffering from gender dysphoria, such
individuals are still constrained in their reproductive capacity. It has been noted that
transgendered individuals also have ‘reproductive needs’,28 and among trans women
there may be strong desires to parent and gestate a genetically related29 child of their
own.
Trans women could regard pregnancy as the final step in re-aligning their life in ac-
cordance with the gender they psychologically identify with, as opposed to their bi-
ological sex. UTx may remedy this, enabling trans women to experience gestational
motherhood. There will be concerns regarding how safe such a procedure would be,
as UTx into a biologically male body will give rise to more difficulties than perform-
ing such a procedure in a female body. Bra¨nnstro¨m, acknowledged that transgendered
pregnancymay in theory be a possibility, but raised his ethical reservations andwarned
of the anatomical barriers that would have to be overcome:
It should be technically possible, but I don’t know if it’s ethical. The pelvis of men also is
not exactly the same shape as the pelvis of women, and that might pose problems.30
If safety andefficacy concerns aremet, doesprocreative liberty encompass a right to ges-
tate, and if so, does it extend to transwomen?Robertson’s paper does not considerUTx
24 Dina Fine Maron, How a Transgender Woman Could Get Pregnant, SCI. AM., June 15, 2016, http://www.
scientificamerican.com/article/how-a-transgender-woman-could-get-pregnant/ (accessed Aug. 12, 2016).
Leah Samuel, ‘With Womb Transplants a Reality, Transgender Women Dare to Dream of Pregnancies’ STAT
Reporting from the Frontiers of Health and Medicine, Mar. 7, 2016, https://www.statnews.com/2016/03/07/
uterine-transplant-transgender/ (accessed Aug. 12, 2016).
25 P. Sutter,Gender Reassignment and Assisted Reproduction: Present and Future Options for Transsexual People, 16
HUM. REPROD. 612–14 (2001).
26 J.Thomson, Transsexualism and Access to a Child, 8 J. MED. ETHICS 72 (1982).
27 D.Brothers&W.C.Ford,GenderReassignment andAssistedReproduction:AnEthicalAnalysis, 15HUM.REPROD.
737–38 (2000).
28 A. Lawrence et al.,Health Care Needs of Transgendered Patients, 276 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 874 (1996).
29 A male to female transsexual can have a genetically related child if their gametes are stored prior to sex reas-
signment surgery. In vitro fertilization can then be undertaken to fertilize the spermatozoa with donated ova to
create an embryo that can then be implanted into a transplanted uterus.
30 M. Henderson, How Mother and Daughter Could Share the Same Womb, THE TIMES, July 2, 2003 (accessed
Aug. 12, 2016).
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in the context of transgenderedwomen.Yet in countries such as theUK,whichprovides
legal recognition to transgendered women who have transitioned,31 and whom are of-
fered the same legal rights as their female counterparts, this will become a pertinent
question if UTx is offered as clinical treatment inwomen.32 Furthermore questionswill
arise as to whether this should be publicly funded.
More controversially, if it is discoveredhow to achieve safe gestation viaUTx in trans
women, by default, scientists will have discovered how to achieve male pregnancy.
UTx inmen: advancing, enhancing, or destroying human nature?
Robertson argues UTx will not help ‘gay males who are seeking offspring’33 but one of
the controversial issues raised by this advance is the possibility that science may over-
comeanatomical barriers to transplant a uterus not only intowomen, butmen also.This
prospect has not been missed by the media, which has featured headlines such as ‘Sci-
entists areNowAttempting to Figure outHow toGetMen Pregnant’34 and ‘Will Uter-
ine TransplantsMakeMale Pregnancy Possible?’35 Notions of male pregnancy are not
new, in the 1980s, the biological possibility of extra uterine pregnancy led to tabloids
reporting that ‘the era of pregnant men had arrived’. Teresi and McAuliffe noted the
high level of response by men who wanted to experience pregnancy:
The story struck a nerve inmanymen. Scientists doingwork on the cutting edge of human
reproductionwere barragedwith letters frommenwhowanted to bemothers. Somewere
transsexuals. But otherswere conventionalmenwho simplywanted to experience the joys
of pregnancy.36
Men who may seek to utilize UTx could be heterosexual, allowing for the couple to
jointly share the reproductive burdens and joys of pregnancy in both gestating a child
each. Homosexual couples may also wish to procreate in this fashion, one of them do-
nating the spermwhilst the other gestates the baby; involving both in the reproductive
process and avoiding the need for a surrogate. Single men may also wish to opt for this
procedure, avoiding the legally uncertain route of commissioning a surrogate.37
Onwhether procreative libertymay provide grounds formen to argue a right to ges-
tate, Sparrow argues that given the role played by the right to reproductive liberty in
other debates about reproductive technologies, it will be extremely difficult to deny that
this right extends to include male pregnancy. However, he asserts that
31 A transsexual woman, who has obtained legal recognition of her chosen gender under theGender Recognition
Act 2004 is, in a legal context, to be treated the same other women.
32 Under the legislative frameworkswhichwould governgender reassignment andUTx;TheGenderRecognition
Act 2004,TheHuman Fertilization and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended in 2008) andTheHuman Tissue
Act 2004, transsexual women are legally entitled to be treated consistently with their female counterparts.
33 Robertson, supra note 5, at 70.
34 Micaiah Bilger, Scientists are Now Attempting to Figure out How to Get Men Pregnant, LifeNews.com, June 20,
2016, http://www.lifenews.com/2016/06/20/scientists-are-now-attempting-to-figure-out-how-to-get-men-
pregnant/ (accessed Aug. 12, 2016).
35 Denise Grady,Will Uterine Transplants Make Male Pregnancy Possible?, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/
16/insider/will-uterine-transplants-make-male-pregnancy-possible.html? r=0 (accessed Aug. 1, 2016).
36 D. Teresi & K.Mc Auliffe,Male Pregnancy, in SEX /MACHINE: READINGS IN CULTURE, GENDER ANDTECHNOL-
OGY 175 (P. D. Hopkins ed., Indiana University Press, 1998).
37 TheSurrogacyArrangementsAct 1985.Note section 59ofTheHumanFertilization andEmbryologyAct 2008
amends this statute.
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‘this conclusion constitutes a “reductio ad absurdum” of the idea of reproductive liberty
as it is currently used in bioethics. Any notion of a right to reproductive liberty that ex-
tends as far as a man’s right to gestate has lost contact with the facts about the biology of
reproduction and its significance in a normal human life that made it plausible to defend
the existence of such a right in the first place.’ 38
He therefore advises that the extent of this purported right in other contexts in which
it is deployed needs revisiting.
CONCLUSION
Robertson’s paper addresses many of the issues raised by UTx in women, but the pa-
per is confined to discussing the immediate purpose of UTx, namely as treatment to
restore natural function in women suffering uterine factor infertility.Themore contro-
versial prospects generated by the advance are not the focus of his paper. As one of the
great writers on procreative liberty, it would be interesting to know his perspective on
whether procreative liberty encompasses a right to gestate and whether this is limited
to women, or whether trans women and men can also assert a right to gestate, should
science conquer this last frontier.
Whilst the author acknowledges that it may be the case that UTx in men (enabling
either gender to gestate) is never possible; if scientists do conquer this last frontier, it
will revolutionize reproduction as we know it and raise a plethora of legal, ethical, and
social issueswhich regulatorswill have to grapplewith.Waiting until these technologies
are possible to debate these questions is imprudent, for new technologies are marked
by the rapidity at which they develop. It might be that unisex gestation is a step too far,
and just because sciencemay one day render this possible, does notmeanwe should do
it; but the period to contemplate it, is now, rather than reactive ad-hoc measures and
responses, as are so often the case in the arena of assisted reproductive technologies.
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